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1. Introduction 
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) is an agreement between governments that aims to ensure that international trade in 
specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival. It currently has 166 
parties or members and it encourages universal membership. CITES is regarded as one of the 
most important and successful legal international conservation instruments. It works to prevent 
illegal trade or trans-shipment through non-parties; promotes compliance with and enforcement 
of the requirements of the Convention; and facilitates action against non-compliance. 
The species covered by CITES are listed in three appendices according to the degree of 
protection they need. Appendix I includes species threatened with extinction, and trade in these 
species is prohibited except in exceptional circumstances. Appendix II includes species not 
necessarily threatened with extinction, but in which trade must be controlled. Appendix III 
includes species that require protection within at least one member country (CITES 2004). 
The value of annual trade in wildlife is estimated at $200bn and growing.  The precise 
contribution by individual species is difficult to estimate owing to illegal trades and poor 
economic information along the trade chain. CITES is increasingly seeking guidance on 
economic factors and analysis to inform its decisions, implementation and enforcement.  
This study is a product of the recommendations made by delegates at the first CITES meeting 
on ￿Economic incentives￿ held in December 2003. Several economic incentives (EIs) were 
identified, one of which is the individual transferable quota (ITQ) system, which is the subject 
of this scoping paper.  ITQs are increasingly being seen as a promising mechanism for 
achieving both conservation and socio-economic benefits. 
This scoping paper builds on Bulte, Swanson and Van Kooten (2003) which notes that ￿the 
challenge is somehow to bring all of the costs and benefits of wildlife exploitation and 
conservation together so that those making decisions about wildlife (whether wildlife managers, 
poachers or traders) take them all into account. If this is to occur, it will be necessary to develop 
appropriate economic instruments and incentives￿. Furthermore, CITES ￿Strategic Vision 
Through 2005￿ acknowledges the pressures of human populations and their development needs 
in developing countries, emphasising that for trade to be responsible, social and economic 
incentives are needed. One way in which CITES is seeking to deliver on this vision is through 
broadening its perspective to include economic approaches to pro-poor conservation, including 
investigating the use of economic incentives for commercially valuable species. 
This study explores the applicability of ITQs to the Caspian sturgeon fishery. It introduces the 
broad concepts of an ITQ system and explores EI design, implementation, enforcement and 
compliance issues in the case of the sturgeon population in the Caspian Sea. Despite its 
Appendix II listing, anecdotal evidence indicates that the in situ sturgeon population remains 
threatened. Using information from a number of case studies where ITQs have been 
implemented, it highlights the limitations of ITQs and indicates research necessary to design 
and implement a sustainable system. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical underpinnings of fisheries 
and fisheries management. It also provides a general introduction to ITQ systems, how they can 
be established, and some necessary institutional requirements for them to function effectively. 
Using case study evidence from Iceland, New Zealand and other countries, Section 3 presents 
available options for ITQ programme design and lessons learned from these experiences. 2 
Section 4 presents issues specific to the use of ITQs for the sturgeon population in the Caspian 
Sea. Section 5 highlights some specific programme design issues for sturgeon, and proposes a 
research agenda. Finally, section 6 concludes with some implications for policy. 
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2.  A review of individual transferable quotas 
2.1 The Economics of fishing 
The way a fish stock is used and managed depends greatly upon its attendant property rights. In 
economic terms a fishery is a common property or open access resource. Open access rights 
exist when there are no clearly defined property rights, such that individuals can enter the 
fishery industry and exploit the fish stock without restrictions. Common property rights exist 
when a defined group of people own a resource. 
Open access is not optimal since theoretically individuals have no incentives to conserve the 
resource into the future. Instead, the initial existence of profits in the industry attracts new 
entrants to the fishery, increasing the harvesting effort and making the resource scarcer. Catch 
per unit effort (CPUE) declines, raising the unit cost of catching fish. New entrants will increase 
until total costs have increased and total revenue has fallen to the point where profits are zero 
(rent dissipation), and the stock of fish declines below the optimal level (see Box 1.1 for more 
detail). 
To correct these market failures and achieve the optimal level of fishing effort and harvesting, 
governments must intervene in the fishing market. In the past, this was undertaken using 
traditional command-and-control approaches, whereby the regulating authority imposes input, 
output, or technological restrictions to control fishing effort and harvests. These have included 
restrictions on fishing gear (e.g., mesh size of nets and size and power of fishing vessels) and 
the number of days at sea, and the introduction of fishing quotas. These methods failed to alter 
the underlying behavioural incentives inherent in the fishing industry, and were largely 
ineffective.
1 
Economists tend to advocate the use of economic incentive methods (or market-based 
instruments) that can theoretically achieve a given harvest level at a minimum economic cost to 
society. Examples include taxes on resource rent, user fees and landing fees.
2 Another method 
that has more recently been applied in more than 75 fisheries (Tietenberg 2003) is an individual 
transferable quota (ITQ) system. 
2.2 Individual transferable quotas 
An ITQ programme can eliminate the open access nature of certain resources (including 
fisheries), promoting conservative harvesting and more efficient management of the resource. 
Under an ITQ programme, the regulating authority specifies a total allowable catch (TAC) and 
issues an equivalent number of quotas to reflect this (where one ITQ represents the right to 
harvest a predetermined number of tonnes of fish, or alternatively, a share of the TAC). The 
TAC is the aggregate amount of fish that is legally allowed to be harvested in a given time 
period (such as a season or a year). The ITQs are then either distributed free of charge or 
auctioned off to fishermen. ITQ programmes guarantee a share of the current TAC and, under 
                                                     
1 Fish stocks collapsed in the New England groundfish fishery and Atlantic Canada￿s cod fishery despite the application of such restrictions 
(PERC, 2002). 
2 Landing fees, whereby a Pigovian style tax on the catch is applied, are uncommon in practice. One example where this has been applied is 
Namibia, which has differential landing fees depending on ownership and land-based processing. For a theoretical comparison of landing fees vs 
ITQs, see Arnason (1991) and Weitzman (2002). 4 
the appropriate conditions, assure quota holders a share of (or the opportunity to bid for a share 
of) any increase in future harvests achieved through stock rebuilding. This eliminates incentives 
for fishermen to ￿race to fish￿ but creates incentives to adhere to their share of the TAC.  ITQs 
also reduce overfishing by compensating participants for fishery exit in over-crowded fisheries. 
They also stimulate technological development by increasing the returns to licence holders on 
investments in research or improved fishing technology.  
One crucial concern is the enforcement of quotas. Participants in the industry need to be 
confident that their rights to the resource are secure and exclusive. There is particular concern 
about CITES Appendix II-listed species because trade has previously been identified as a cause 
of population decline, and the associated species products often attract high values.  
Box 2.1 The economic approach to fisheries management 
Economists approach the management of a population or stock of fish in much the same way as they approach the 
management of any renewable or productive asset. For instance, personal savings are a renewable resource in the 
sense that savings earn interest, r, and accumulate over time at this rate. If this is the sole source of income then an 
individual has to decide their level of consumption over time: to consume an amount less than, equal to or greater 
than the interest accrued, in which case savings will respectively increase, remain constant or decrease over time.  
Decisions regarding consumption today have implications for future time periods. The problem is a dynamic one ￿ 
one less Euro of savings today leads to lost interest on that Euro for all future periods. The well-being obtained 
from consumption may differ depending upon the time period in which the consumption takes place. In general, 
people are impatient and will prefer one Euro of consumption today than tomorrow, and such impatience is 
reflected by the individual’s ￿discount rate￿, ρ . Higher levels of impatience or discounting of the future will tend to 
increase consumption now, and reduce savings. A range of external factors also influences the consumption/savings 
decision. 
Economists think of fisheries in largely the same way, where the fish population, say S, is the stock of savings, the 
rate of growth/recruitment of the fish population is the rate of interest, and the harvest/catch is the consumption 
decision. Also, in order to maximise welfare, returns from the fishery need to be compared with those of alternative 
options. This is similar to a consumer comparing bank rates; an entrepreneur wanting to maximise profits or a 
government wanting to maximise welfare will compare the return from fishing to the rate of return from alternative 
projects, e.g., health or education. Likewise with the external and individual effects that determine the harvesting 
decision; an individual or government managing the fishery that does not greatly value the future (be it welfare, 
consumption or profits) will tend to increase the current harvest rate. With savings, the value of both outside options 
and individual features are generally captured by the rate of interest, r. Higher harvests allow greater transfer of 
profits to alternative high yielding projects and consequently lead to lower fish populations. 
But there are important areas where the analogy with savings does not apply. Highlighting the differences is helpful 
in explaining the economic approach to fisheries management. First, biological resources differ dynamically to 
finance; they interact and compete for food, procreate, and have defensive strategies, for example. As a result of 
this, whereas the interest rate on savings remains constant regardless of the level of saving, the growth of the fish 
population, g, will generally vary with the size of the population, S. In algebraic terms: () S g g = . Figure 1 shows 
a common stylisation of the relationship as a logistic growth function. 
Second, where consumption of savings is costless, fishing effort, E, is a costly activity. Total costs, C, are 
commonly related to search costs and, in the case of search fisheries, are dependent upon the resource stock: 
() E S c C = (Bulte and Van Kooten 1999). It is usual to assume that harvesting costs increase as the stock 
decreases, since fish will be harder to find. Similarly it is often assumed that the catch per unit of effort, E, is 
increasing in the stock. Where the harvesting costs, productivity of fishing and the growth of the resource are 
dependent upon the resource stock, current harvesting decisions will have three effects: i) changes in the growth 
rate of the stock; ii) increases in the costs of harvesting and; iii) decreases in the productivity of effort, in all future 
periods.  Thus, when the resource manager or government wishes to maximise the value of the fishery over time 
they must consider all the future/dynamic effects of current harvesting. Economists call the value of such dynamic 
effects the ￿resource rent￿ or ￿scarcity rent￿, and it reflects the value of leaving the fish in the sea. The optimal 5 
management of a resource would include the resource rent as an additional cost of depletion; just as lost interest 
represents a cost of consuming one￿s savings. Resource rents therefore represent a divergence between the unit 
price and cost of harvesting and accrue as profit to the resource owner.  
Third, where the stock of savings is a private resource, owned exclusively by the individual, fisheries are frequently 
owned either publicly by a sovereign state(s), commonly by regional communities, or are not subject to distinct 
property rights at all (open access).  
Fishery dynamics: The fishery management problem is dynamic since decisions today affect future well-being. 
Furthermore, the returns from the fishery must be compared to outside options. When the  problem is fully 
addressed, welfare maximisation requires that the rate of return from the fishery must be equated with that of 
outside options. For example, where costs of harvesting are not dependent upon the stock level (as would be the 
case for a schooling fishery), the outside options are represented by the interest rate, r, and the price of fish is 
constant over time. Equating returns across assets requires that  ( ) S g r ’ = .  ( ) S g’  is the slope of the growth 
function in Figure 1 and reflects the growth rate of the fish population or the ￿rate of interest￿ for fish.  There are a 
number of things to notice here. First, since the slope of the growth function is zero at  MSY S , maintaining the stock 
in order to harvest the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) does not maximise welfare over time, (i.e., is not 
efficient) where the interest rate is positive. Second, the efficient stock is lower than  MSY S  since the slope of the 
growth function  () () S g’  is only positive at lower levels of the stock. The management rule then states that where 
the rate of return of the fishery is higher (lower) than for outside options:  ( ) r S g > ’ () ( ) r S g < ’ , it is welfare 
enhancing to increase (decrease) harvesting and reduce (increase) the stock of fish until  () S g r ’ = . Where price of 
fish is changing over time at a rate  P ∆ , this increases the rate of interest for fish and optimality requires that 
() S g P r ’ + ∆ = . By the same logic this means that if the resource is increasing in value over time, the rate of 
return from the fishery is equated with r where the rate of growth of the resource,  ( ) S g’ , is smaller and the stock 
therefore larger. Hence, with positive price growth, reducing harvests and increasing the stock increase welfare. 
Indeed, when a search fishery is considered, and harvest costs vary with the stock size, the effect of harvesting upon 
future harvesting costs must be considered in determining the optimal level. With costs decreasing in the stock, this 
will tend to increase the optimal resource stock. In sum, the optimal stock can be higher or lower than  MSY S , but 
only equal by coincidence. This is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Under open access, however, entrants to the fishery do not consider the full resource cost (they ignore the resource 
rent), and fishing effort per unit of harvest increases as these rents are dissipated compared to the efficient outcome. 
If, during this process, the stock under open access falls below  MVP S  in Figure 1, ill-defined property rights lead to 
exhaustion of the fishery. Furthermore, the classical economic model predicts that extinction of the resource under 
open access is more likely to occur the higher the price level of fish (p)
3 and the lower the growth rate of the fish 
population and the harvesting costs (c). The same can be said for optimal exhaustion, except that, in addition, high 
returns from outside options (r) will also increase the likelihood of exhaustion. Optimal exhaustion is less likely the 
higher the rate of price change over time ( P ∆ ), the higher the increase in costs arising from reduced stocks  ( ) S c’ , 
and the higher the physical growth rate of the resource,  ( ) S g . These simple ideas form that basis of economic 





                                                     
3 Some authors have suggested that a highly priced resource increases the likelihood that the resource will be 
monitored and hence may reduce the likelihood of exhaustion under open access (Hotte et al. 2001). 6 
 
Figure  2.1  The logistic growth function, minimum viable population and maximum 
sustainable yield 
 
Because quotas can be traded, an ITQ system can reduce fishing effort at a minimum cost, as 
the most efficient fishers purchase ITQs from the least efficient. Unlike conventional quotas, 
which require that each party or group is limited to a specific quantity, a market in ITQs is 
established for regulated vessels. This allows fishers to trade quotas with one another at a 
market price determined dynamically by the supply and demand for ITQs. Being a function of 
the level of the TAC and the marginal harvesting costs of the vessels, this market equilibrium 
links to the environmental characteristics of the fish stock,. The market creates genuine 
incentives to trade: regulated vessels will wish to purchase or lease additional ITQs if their 
marginal harvesting costs are higher than the prevailing ITQ price. Similarly, regulated vessels 
with marginal harvesting costs that are lower than the equilibrium ITQ price will wish to sell 
their excess ITQs.  
Box 2.2 sets out a number of key factors underlying ITQ systems and guiding their success 
under different circumstances. 
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Box 2.2  The logistic growth function, carrying capacity and the maximum sustainable yield 
i)  The logistic growth function: The logistic growth function shown in Figure 2.1 characterises some essential 
features of biological resources. First, the extreme points of the stock,  MVP S  and  CC S , represent the minimum 
viable population (MVP) and the carrying capacity of the resource respectively. Growth is assumed to be negative 
below  MVP S , reflecting the absence of sufficient females, genetic diversity etc., to maintain recruitment above 
natural losses. Below the MVP, negative growth leads to exhaustion. The stock reaches a maximum at  CC S  as the 
natural resources available to maintain the stock, e.g., food, come under increasing competition. Second, the growth 
function reflects the fact that growth at all levels of the resource stock is low, reflecting e.g., the absence of females 
and the competition for resources respectively. At medium levels of the stock, growth of the stock increases 
reaching a maximum of  MSY g  at  MSY S . Growth at this level of the resource represents the maximum sustainable 
yield (MSY), i.e. the maximum harvest that could be obtained from the resource without reducing the resource 
stock. Naturally, magnitudes of  MSY MVP CC S S S , ,  and  MSY g  will vary from one fishery to the next, and the 
logistic function should be seen as a generalisation and a useful benchmark for analysis. 
ii)  MSY as a management ideal: The maximum sustainable yield stock,  MSY S , has often been regarded as the 
level of harvesting at which fisheries should be managed since it represents the stock at which the maximum 
increment to the population occurs. However, there are several reasons why this strategy is considered to be flawed 
(Conrad and Clarke 1990): i) the MSY is not sustainable over the long run due to natural fluctuations; ii) MSY is 
unstable: if the sustainable yield in a given year declines then continued harvesting at the old MSY will deplete the 
stock over time (this instability is represented by the arrows in Figure 2.1 which imply that deviations from the 
sustainable harvest are unstable at or below the MSY stock, but stable above); iii) the MSY completely ignores all 
social and economic considerations of renewable resource management. Box 2.I includes a discussion about the 
economically efficient management of a renewable fishery resource. In this discussion is becomes clear that the 
MSY will only become the economically efficient stock level under very specific circumstances. One of those is 
when the return from outside options or the social discount rate is equal to zero. 
 
Setting the total allowable catch (TAC) 
For most fish stocks, the benchmark used to set the TAC is to achieve a stock that will produce 
the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) (see Figure 2.1 and Box 2.1).  The size of a TAC is 
usually obtained on an annual basis by applying a target exploitation rate to an estimate of the 
current stock size. It is difficult to determine the target exploitation rate and to measure the stock 
size because of the variability in the relationship between stock size and the generation of 
subsequent offspring, and the difficulty in accurately measuring fish populations in the wild 
(NRC 1999). There is an inherent incentive for the regulator to opt for more conservative 
overall quotas in the knowledge that each quota holder will capture the benefits of conservation 
through higher catch limits in subsequent years. Yet, the target fishing industry rarely welcomes 
conservative approaches. 
Fish species are seldom caught individually. Setting TACs for multi-species fisheries entails 
additional innovation in ITQ design; examples include species aggregation into a single TAC 
and quota.
4 
                                                     
4 In the British Colombia individual quota trawl fishery, perch and redeye are treated as an aggregate species; in 
New Zealand, eight species of flatfish form an aggregate. The ability to conduct species aggregation will depend on 
biological criteria such as age structure, recruitment, and year class strength, though in most cases it is unlikely that 
this will be optimal (Squires et al. 1998). 8 
Defining the ITQ 
A quota is often defined as a specific tonnage that may be harvested (e.g., one ITQ share equals 
one tonne) for a specific fishing season in a specific fishing ground. It can also be expressed as 
shares of the TAC, so that the harvests for a given share of quota fluctuate with changes in the 
level of the TAC. Less common are ￿value-based￿ quotas, which regulate the value of harvested 
fish (for a discussion on this see Turner 1996). The regulating authority will also need to 
determine the applicability of the programme, i.e., whether vessels of all sizes are affected by 
the ITQ programme.
5 
Allocating the ITQs 
The initial quota allocation is one of the most contentious issues associated with an ITQ system. 
It can generate windfall benefits to the initial recipients and alter social and economic 
relationships among individuals and communities. Often, ITQ allocation is based on an average 
of a few years of historical harvests.
6 Alternatively, the ITQs can be auctioned off to the highest 
bidders. 
One potential design option to reduce the adverse distributional effects that ITQs can have on 
communities is to allocate the quotas directly to communities. Experience here includes: 
  Alaska￿s Bering Sea Community Development Quota programme for the indigenous 
population; and 
  New Zealand￿s ITQ programme to benefit the Maori people.  
For these allocations the community retains control over the transfers and is thus able to protect 
community interests (Tietenberg 2003). Other options include letting licence holders determine 
the initial quota allocation among themselves. 
New entrants and monopoly power 
ITQs that are initially distributed free of charge to existing fishers in the industry need to make 
provision for new entrants. Without this, future entrants will face a financial disadvantage 
because of the additional capital investment required to obtain ITQs. Allowing new entrants is 
key to both ensuring competition within the quota system and keeping existing quota holders 
efficient. Mechanisms such as annual auctions of ITQs help to ensure the process of quota 
allocation is relatively seamless. 
One flaw in ITQ programme design, which can undermine the economic efficiency of the   
programme, is that it  allows certain quota holders to corner the market, obtaining monopoly 
control over the landings as they purchase more and more quotas. Various design options have 
been introduced to restrict this (see Section 3.1 for examples from Iceland). 
                                                     
5  For further discussion, see FAO (1997). 
6 One can also include a component for the use of ￿clean￿ fishing techniques (i.e. minimal incidental by-catch) to 
reward those who have been more efficient in the past and to provide incentives to minimise incidental by-catch in 
the future. 9 
Banking and borrowing of quotas 
Banking refers to the ability of fishers to carry excess quotas over into the next year or fishing 
season. Borrowing of quotas enables fishers to harvest more in the current season by borrowing 
against future quotas. There are balanced arguments: the ability to bank and/or borrow quotas 
provides fishers with additional flexibility to adjust their harvest levels towards the economic 
optimum (PERC 2002). Yet, it can mean that total harvest (annual or season) exceeds the TAC. 
In practice, such flexibility can be an essential element of a multi-species fishery with volatile 
populations. However, there are attendant administrative and management implications that 
must be costed and factored in. 
Monitoring and enforcement 
Monitoring and enforcement are crucial for a well functioning ITQ programme, to help regulate 
internal abuse by licence holders and external abuse by non-licence holders. Internally, accurate 
and consistent measurement of fish catch will ensure that the total harvest adheres closely to the 
TAC. In addition, the price of an ITQ should reflect its true value.  
High grading ￿ that is, discarding lower valued fish in favour of higher valued fish ￿ is a 
common problem that occurs when there is no monitoring. It is likely to be less of a problem if: 
   there are minimal price differentials by fish size or quality;
7  
   there are limited opportunities to catch the fish at another time;  
   the gear employed effectively targets species of the preferred size; or 
   there are mesh size or other gear restrictions, which limit the catch of small fish (Squires et 
al. 1998). 
To address the problem of high grading, on-board observers are used in the multi-species British 
Colombia ITQ trawl fishery (Squires et al.1998) and on larger vessels in the Alaska ITQ 
programme (Buck 1995). 
Externally, monitoring and enforcement measures help reduce poaching and illegal harvesting. 
It is argued that ITQ programmes provide incentives for self-enforcement among fishers 
because the value of an ITQ depends on the integrity of both the system design and its practice. 
Although individuals stand to gain by exceeding their quota, they are adversely affected if other 
quota owners do likewise. In general if the fishery is overfished, the incomes of fishers are 
reduced and the price of quotas will fall. If all fishers adhere to the rules, all should benefit in 
line with the quota they hold. A system of financial penalties often provides fishers with extra 
incentive to comply with their quota restrictions. 
                                                     
7 Incentives to high-grade will tend to be greater the more dockside market prices are differentiated by size or 
quality of individual fish. 10 
2.3 Some further considerations for use of an ITQ system 
Sufficient operators 
There should be a sufficiently large number of participants to ensure a competitive market for 
ITQs and reduce the possibility of monopolisation of resources. But the number should not be 
so large that it undermines the regulator￿s authority to manage and administer the programme. 
Adequate authority 
It is important to establish in advance whether the relevant government entity has sufficient 
jurisdiction over the geographic area where the programme is to be implemented. If the quotas 
are to be traded across national jurisdictions, they will need to be consistent and fungible. 
Although there are no current examples of multi-country ITQs, such a programme would 
require common design elements, including standards for determining applicability, 
measurement and reporting, record-keeping, enforcement, and penalties for non-compliance 
(EPA, 2003). Clearly, monitoring and enforcement should be undertaken by an international 
authority since national governments would have incentives to under-report harvest levels if 
these exceed the national TAC so as to avoid the non-compliance penalties.  
Adequate political and market institutions 
Finally, for the trading element of the ITQ programme to work, a country must have the same 
institutions and incentives in place as those required for any type of market to work. These 
include:  
  a developed system of private contracts and property rights;  
  a private sector that makes business decisions based on the desire to lower costs and 
increase profits; and  
  a government culture that allows private businesses to make decisions about ￿how￿ to 
achieve objectives with minimum intervention (EPA 2003). 11 
3.  Case studies of ITQ systems for fisheries 
This section details case studies of ITQ programmes for fisheries in operation in Iceland, New 
Zealand and the USA. These are not CITES-listed species but they are included to illustrate key 
points about the functioning of ITQ programmes that need to be borne in mind when 
developing appropriate economic instruments for CITES-listed species. Each case study is 
analysed using the characteristics explained in Section 2.  Table 3.1 summarises information on 
the fisheries. 
 
Table 3.1 Selected comparative statistics on the case studies 
 








a -  Limited  - 
Seasonability 
of fishing 
-  Varies according to fishery  -  Varies according 
to country 
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Varies according to species  1-2 years for surf 
clams 
14-23 years for 
females 
Sources: a) Eythorssen (2000) b) Raymakers (2002) c) Hersoug (2003) 
3.1 Cod and the Quota Management Programme, Iceland 
Background 
In 1979 ITQs were first applied to a local herring fishery. In 1980 vessel quotas were introduced 
in the capelin fishery, and were made transferable in 1986. In 1982 an ITQ system was applied 
to the cod industry to alleviate the twin pressures of overfishing and overcapitalisation. Cod is 
one of the most important fisheries for Iceland’s economy and there is an unwillingness to 
accept large short-term losses to achieve longer-term gains. Since 1990, the Quota Management 
Programme has incorporated most fisheries in Icelandic waters and included approximately 900 
smaller vessels that had been fishing previously without restrictions. As a result, the total 
number of ITQ holders increased from 451 to 1,155. The duration of the ITQ programme is 
now indefinite, and ITQs are fully divisible and independently transferable. 
 
The industry reports that ITQs have brought about a reduction in vessel numbers. For example, 
in the herring fishery, the number of vessels has fallen from 200 in 1980 to 29 in 1996 (NRC 
1999), and between 1992 and 1999 the total number of vessels fishing under quota in all sectors 
decreased by 40 percent. Significantly, employment dropped by only one quarter between 1983 
and 1997 (Runolfsson 1999). 
 
Setting the TAC 
Management of the Icelandic cod stock through the ITQ system has proved less successful than 
for herring and capelin. The cod population has apparently fallen because of an excessively high 
TAC. Indeed, the TAC set by the government in Iceland has consistently exceeded the 
recommendations of the Icelandic Marine Research Institute (NRC 1999). Cod was over-fished, 
and a record low stock was reported in 1992, although there was a subsequent recovery. In 
1995, the TAC was set for the first time on the basis of a ￿TAC rule￿, proposed in a bio-12 
economic study of the fishery, of either 25 per cent of the fishable stock or 155,000 metric 
tonnes, whichever is greater. Both are considered prudently conservative. 
Defining the ITQs 
The cod ITQ programme was initially established for one year only. It was seen by many as a 
temporary emergency measure for stock recovery. Quotas did not, therefore, constitute true 
private property rights. However, following successive two-year extensions, since 1990 there 
has been a regime of quotas of indefinite duration.  
 
Initially, each fishing vessel over ten tonnes was allotted a fixed annual proportion of future 
TAC for cod and five other demersal fish species. Currently, the ITQ programme divides access 
to the resource among vessel owners based on their fishing record during the three years 
preceding implementation of the programme. Initially, ITQ shares were not fully divisible or 
independently tradable and could only be bought or sold undivided along with the fishing vessel 
to which they were originally allotted, although they could be leased relatively freely. 
Allocating the ITQs 
   The ITQ rights are distributed free of charge, and are subject to annual renewal charges  
(currently approximately one per cent of fisheries￿ gross revenue) that have been increasing 
over time. 
   Vessels of less than six gross registered tonnes (GRT) are subject to limits on the number of 
fishing days and an overall limit on catch. 
   In order to hold quota shares, a person or company must have access to the vessel to which 
the quota shares are allocated and must fish at least half of their quotas every second year. 
   Only one-half of the catch taken by vessels fishing with longlines in the winter months is 
counted against the quota. 
   Quota shares are transferable and can be leased or permanently sold. 
New entrants and monopoly power 
Because of concern about the rapid concentration of ITQs in the hands of large vertically 
integrated companies, the Ministry of Fisheries set up an internal committee. This committee 
recommended limits for individual quota holders of 10 per cent for cod and haddock and 20 per 
cent for other species. In addition, a new licensing scheme stipulated that new vessels could be 
introduced to the fisheries only if one or more existing vessels of equivalent size (in GRT) were 
eliminated in return. 
Banking of quotas 
For groundfish,
8 there is a certain flexibility built into the programme. Twenty per cent of 
annual quota can be shifted to the subsequent year with one penalty ￿ the volume of extended 
quota is subtracted from the subsequent year￿s quota allocation. This is less harmful to stock 
conservation than it might appear. The exploitable stock of groundfish consists of ten year 
classes or more, which evens out the pattern of catches over time despite large variations in the 
size of year classes. 
                                                     
8 Groundfish include cod, haddock, halibut, redfish, saithe and account for 80 per cent of Iceland￿s wetfish value. 13 
Monitoring and enforcement 
Trading of quotas appears to be brisk; in the ￿fishing year￿ 1993/4 the trading of cod and saithe 
quotas amounted to 44 per cent and 96 per cent, respectively, of the total catch. However, the 
same quota can be traded more than once. If a quota is to be leased or sold to a vessel operating 
from a different place, the consent of the municipal government and the local fishermen￿s union 
must be obtained ￿ although this is usually a formality.  
Other issues 
Over-catch: Vessels must acquire an equivalent amount of cod ITQs to cover their over-catch to 
prevent loss of their fishing licenses. The price of ITQs leased for this purpose tends to fluctuate 
considerably in relation to demand. One reported impact is dead fish being discarded at sea ￿ 
especially towards the end of the fishing year when ITQs are scarce and the lease price is 
inordinately high. This contributes to the waste of living resources and is ecologically 
irresponsible. 
 
Employment: In fishing villages that have lost most or all of their quota, large-scale 
unemployment occurs, causing breakdown of communities. There are therefore demands for 
effective limits on quota transfers between regions and communities, to avoid employment 
uncertainty. Such limits are applied in Norwegian fisheries. 
Allocation issues:   
   Quota duration. Although quota allocations are of indefinite duration and could be 
revoked by the Icelandic Parliament at any time, the prices of quota shares suggest that the 
risk of this is low. In 1997, permanent quota shares for cod were trading at about eight 
times the cost of renting quota shares for a year. 
   Benefit distribution. Prior to the programme, fishing was typically regarded as a ￿co-
venture￿ between vessel owners and crew. However, the initial allocation of quotas to vessel 
owners changed this symbiotic relationship, apparently favouring vessel owners over crew 
members. This has led to claims that vessel owners have become rich at the expense of  
crew members. There are similar claims in other fisheries, e.g., in Alaska￿s halibut and 
sablefish fisheries.  But here practical difficulties, such as inadequate records on the fishing 
history of crew (a problem that does not exist in Iceland), were the main causes of the 
perverse or inefficient outcomes. However, this problem reflects a broader issue of a 
common bias in ITQ allocation toward capital ownership in both the theory and the 
practical design of ITQs. 
Summary evaluation 
This study highlights the implementation timeframe of an apparently successful ITQ 
programme, which has extended to all fisheries and all vessels. The strategy was to commence 
with larger vessels and the most significant and/or the most threatened or emblematic species or 
fisheries. It took several attempts to define an ITQ system that both supported the wild 
population and was acceptable to fishers. Careful and consistent monitoring has paid off; many 
of the innovations occurred ten years after the ITQ system was established. 14 
3.2 Quota management system, New Zealand 
Background 
Since the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) was declared in 1978, the number of New Zealand￿s 
domestic operators has increased. The Fisheries Amendment Act of 1986 established the Quota 
Management System (QMS). A year later, it covered 30 species of the 140 commercial species 
in the EEZ, with each fishery for each species divided into a number of different fishery 
management units (officially designated as fishstocks).  The number of fishstocks ranges from 
two to ten for any given species, with a total of 179 different fishstocks in the QMS. Its wide 
success has led to the government introducing plans to include all remaining commercially 
harvested species into the QMS. There has been no detailed investigation of changes in the fleet 
by sector owing to the QMS, but a recent study examined the whole fleet by size class and 
found significant declines in vessel numbers only in the ten-metre class. Most other vessel 
classes have expanded or remained static in terms of total tonnages, while catch volumes have 
increased at a greater rate (Connor and Alden, 2000; Arnason, 2002). Employment figures are 
inconsistent among reports, but the trends are clear. There has been a modest increase in 
employment in harvesting and a large increase in employment in the processing sector 
(Sissenwine and Mace 1992, Batstone and Sharp 1999, Dewees 1998). 
Setting the TAC 
TACs have been established since 1986, based, for most inshore stocks, on a largely qualitative 
assessment of average reported landings during periods when the catches were considered to be 
￿sustainable￿. For a number of the prime inshore species, the initial TACs were set at levels of 
up to 75 per cent below the catches reported immediately prior to the introduction of ITQs. To 
smooth the economic impact of the likely alterations within the industry, the government 
provided adjustment assistance to the fishing industry in the form of a buyback of quota 
entitlements in certain fisheries. This provides some insurance to industry participants wishing 
to leave the fishery. 
Defining the ITQ 
Initially the ITQs were defined as a given tonnage of fish. But legislation in 1990 redefined the 
quotas as a percentage of the TAC. 
Initial allocation of ITQs 
Specific innovations include the following. 
   The initial allocation of ITQs was made free of charge on the basis of catch history over a 
period of qualifying years.
9 
   ITQs were allocated in perpetuity and authorised the holders to take specified quantities of 
each species annually in each fishstock. 
   Modifications were made following analysis of the buyback scheme and information 
generated by the ITQ programme.  
                                                     
9 Fishermen who held permits in May 1985 were advised in mid-1985 of their individual catch by species for the 
three years ending in September 1984. They were allowed to choose two of these three years, the average of which 
would form their ITQ. 15 
Monitoring and enforcement 
The New Zealand ITQ monitoring and enforcement system is largely land based. It relies on 
documented product flow control that tracks a fish ￿paper trail￿ through submissions to the 
Ministry of Fisheries. There are rules stipulating that all persons selling, transporting or storing 
fish must keep business records to verify that the product has been purchased from a licensed 
fish receiver, and that all fishermen must sell only to licensed fish receivers.  
 
Fishery officers enforce product flow and fishery auditors examine business accounts and 
records to monitor quota compliance. In addition, cost-effective enforcement is enhanced by the 
use of sophisticated electronic monitoring and surveillance information and analytical systems. 
These include quota monitoring and reporting systems; catch and effort returns; and an observer 
programme and vessel monitoring system. 
Penalties for non-compliance 
Offences within the ITQ programme are not treated as traditional fishing violations but as 
commercial fraud, with penalties including significant fines and forfeiture of fish, vessel, and 
quota shares. 
Other issues 
   Overfishing provisions require very complex computer systems to track catch against quota. 
The inclusion of provisions such as 10 per cent over-runs and under-runs, ￿fishing-on-
behalf￿ arrangements, and the deemed value and by-catch trade-off systems have added 
complexities that have often strained computer systems. Late and sometimes inaccurate 
calculation compounds problems within the ITQ process. 
   Quota busting is believed to occur in some fisheries, especially those for high-value species 
such as rock lobster, paua, snapper and orange roughy. Indeed, the illegal catch of rock 
lobsters in 1993 was estimated at about 25 per cent of the total New Zealand TAC (Annala 
1994). To counter incentives for illegal fishing, recent well-publicised prosecutions, which 
resulted in heavy penalties, including loss of quota shares, vessels, and plant and 
equipment, have allegedly reduced quota busting substantially (NRC 1999). 
   Industry self-regulation. Industry is taking a more active role in helping to reduce illegal 
fishing, especially in the rock lobster and paua fisheries. For example, an industry-initiated 
management plan for the east coast North Island rock lobster fishery, which had the highest 
estimated level of illegal catch, has apparently reduced illegal fishing levels substantially. 
In addition, the fishery is now closed during summer months, the traditional period of 
greatest illegal activity, and all pots must be removed from the water during the closure 
period to assist enforcement. 
 
Summary and evaluation 
The collection and use of relevant information has characterised the management approach in 
this quota management system. Information was key to analysis, design and implementation, 
and it guided monitoring and enforcement efforts. This case highlights the institutional 
requirements of a sustainable ITQ programme and the need for continuous assessment. The ITQ 
programme covers several species, which enables knowledge transfer. 
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3.3 The Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog (SCOQ) programme, USA 
Background 
The surf clam and ocean quahog (SCOQ) fishery off the mid-Atlantic coast came under ITQs in 
1990. Before 1990, the surf clam fishery was managed through limited entry, quarterly quotas 
and fishing time restrictions. However, these limits on effort, together with a growing strong 
year-class and increased vessel harvesting effectiveness led to such over-capacity that, by 1990, 
fishers were restricted to six six-hour trips per quarter. As a result, the Surf Clam and Ocean 
Quahog ITQ programme was adopted under Amendment 8 to the Fishery Management Plan in 
1990. 
 
A rapid decrease in vessels is reported in this fishery: from 180 vessels in 1990 to 80 in 1994, 
and 50 in 1997 (Adelaja et al. 1998: 590; NRC 1999: 64), with accompanying unemployment. 
This is lower than might be expected due to the practice, in the pre-ITQ period, of rotating 
crews among vessels restricted by numbers of allowable days at sea (McCay et al. 1995).   
Efforts to track the fate of redundant crew in this fishery revealed that ex-crew attempted to stay 
in fishing but found suitable work to be scarce (McCay et al. 1995). 
Setting the TAC 
The annual quotas can be set ￿at a level that would meet the estimated annual demand￿, within 
limits set for biological and long-term industry reasons. This policy, which was adopted in 
1992, reflects the long discussion with the fishery industry on reducing the quota below the 
level warranted by stock assessments, especially for ocean quahogs. 
Defining the ITQ 
The ITQ has two components:  
  the  quota share, expressed in percentages of the TAC, which can be transferred 
permanently; and 
  the allocation permit, which is in the form of a tag to be attached to the large steel cages 
used to hold the clams after they are harvested. 
 
Tags can be transferred only within a given calendar year. Annual individual quotas are 
calculated by multiplying the individual quota share by the TAC. 
Initial allocation of ITQs 
Specific innovations include the following. 
 
   The initial allocation of quota share was divided among owners of all regulated vessels
10 
that harvested surf clams or ocean quahogs between 1979 and 1988. 
   Replacement vessels were credited with the catch of vessels they replaced. 
   The minimum holding of SCOQ ITQs is five cages, with no maximum holding and no limit 
to accumulation.
11 
                                                     
10 These were all commercial fishing vessels, mostly working the waters of the Mid-Atlantic region. 
11 Except as might be determined by application of U.S. antitrust law. 17 
   Anyone eligible to own a fishing vessel under US law is entitled to purchase ITQs 
(irrespective of whether they own one), except entities with majority foreign ownership 
(McCay and Brandt 2001). 
   There are no limits on transfer of quota share, but the National Marine and Forestry Service 
(NMFS) northeast regional director must approve all transfers. 
   Cage tags are transferred only within a given calendar year and cannot be transferred 
between October 15 and December 31 of each year. 
Monitoring and enforcement 
Enforcement relies heavily on shore side surveillance, the cage tag system and cross-checking 
logbooks between vessels and processors. Transporters are not required to report, which can 
complicate enforcement effort. 
 
During seasons when state fisheries are open, at-sea and air surveillance is also required to 
reduce the possibility that vessels with state permits or cage tags may stray into federal waters. 
Allocation permits and dealer/processor permits may be suspended, revoked, or modified for 
violations of the Fishery Management Plan. 
Other Issues 
Cost recovery.  No resource rents are collected from SCOQ ITQ fisheries. Instead, allocation 
permit fees are collected to help cover administrative costs, including the production and 
distribution of cage tags. In 1990, 128 vessels participated in the Mid-Atlantic Exclusive 
Economic Zone fishery for surf clams. This had fallen to 75 vessels in 1991 and 31 vessels by 
1998. 
Summary and evaluation 
Aligning industry and management incentives was crucial in this case. Government interaction 
with the industry was a key component of ITQ design and laid the groundwork for later 
financial devolution from the authorities to the industry.  The ITQ programme is subject to a 
number of wider regulations, which complicates incentive structures and demands flexible 
solutions to species depletion.  18 
4.  Implications for ITQs for Sturgeon in the Caspian Sea 
4.1  Background 
Six species of sturgeon inhabit the Caspian Sea and its tributaries: beluga (Huso huso), Russian 
sturgeon (Acipenser gueldenstaedti), stellate sturgeon (A. stellatus), ship sturgeon (A. 
nudiventris), Persian sturgeon (A. persicus) and sterlet (A. ruthenus). All sturgeon species are 
￿threatened￿ to some degree but the precise nature of the threat is unclear but a, number of social 
and environmental factors are blamed for the sturgeon population￿s decline.  
Ninety per cent of the world￿s sturgeon stocks in situ are in the Caspian Sea, which is bordered 
by Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan (the Caspian littoral 
states). In the past, the Soviet Government tightly regulated the harvest of caviar from spawning 
sturgeon. The Ministry of Fisheries in Moscow established quotas for the annual sturgeon catch 
and enforced these with the use of armed inspectors who contained the activities of poachers 
and illegal dealers. Since 1959, it also helped regulate available stock of sturgeon in the Caspian 
Sea through the establishment of hatcheries. In 1992, the emergence of four new independent 
states, and the apparent breakdown of monitoring and enforcement led to an alleged rapid 
increase in illegal sturgeon fishing. 
Figure 4.1  Map of the Caspian Sea littoral states 
 
4.2  CITES and Caspian sturgeon 
Background 
CITES became involved in the sturgeon fisheries because of concerns over the impact of 
unsustainable harvesting levels and the extent of illegal trade in wild specimens (Armstrong and 




Most commentators ￿ and, crucially, key industry participants ￿ agree that bringing the 
international trade of sturgeons and sturgeon products under the well-established monitoring 
                                                     
12 Some of the potential industrial and economic adjustments under a listing are reported in Box 4.1. 19 
and regulatory system of CITES was a positive step for the long-term survival of wild sturgeon 
populations and their fishery.  In addition to international trade regulation, the CITES 
Secretariat has promoted demand-side curbs on the caviar trade, through the development of 
labelling laws for caviar and enforcement efforts. 
 
However, poaching and smuggling have apparently continued largely unabated despite these 
conservation measures. As a result, in 2000 the CITES Animals Committee included sturgeons 
in its Review of Significant Trade. The latter is a mechanism for remedial action when there is 
reason to believe that CITES Appendix-II listed species are being traded at significant levels 
without adequate implementation of CITES provisions.  
 
Following this Review, the CITES Standing Committee recommended at its 45th meeting in 
Paris in June 2001 a Conservation Action Plan for the Caspian Sea sturgeon fisheries. This Paris 
Agreement has helped extend the regulatory power of CITES to domestic trade and markets 
involving certain species threatened by international trade. 
 
The Caspian Bioresources Commission (CBC) is the regional body under CITES that allocates 
the TAC among the Caspian littoral states. It was established in 1992 by the Caspian littoral 
states, minus Iran (who was an observer until she joined in 2002) (Anon., 2002f; Anon., 2002g; 
Anon., 2002h; Anon., 2002i).  
Aggregate statistics on the quota system are available but the processes for determining and 
allocating quotas are not well documented in English. Therefore, this section relies on anecdotal 
information from key informants and literature available in popular press, on the internet and in 
hard copy. 
Setting the TAC 
Traditionally, TAC levels have been set for sturgeon in each of the Caspian littoral states but in 
slightly different ways, reflecting existing management systems and funding available for this 
calculation. For example, Iran determined its TAC using a catch per unit effort (CPUE) stock 
assessment model within an adaptive management approach (Armstrong et al. 2003; Moiseev 
2002). Yet, since 2002 TAC levels submitted to the CBC are based on a cooperative survey and 
derived from sample trawling  
Defining the ITQ 
There is a general trend towards defining ITQs in terms of shares of the TAC as opposed to a 
specific tonnage, because of the greater administrative ease and inherent flexibility of the 
former. 
Allocating the ITQs for the Caspian Sea 
The proportion of TAC each country receives is complicated by debate and science. 
Negotiations on the allocation have traditionally taken into consideration a number of factors 
including hatchery release volume, volume of freshwater flow, available biomass of food 
resources, and historic spawning grounds. Quota allocations are agreed on by the CITES 
Secretariat before exports are permitted (Ivanov et al. 2001; Suciu 2004). The export quotas for 
caviar in previous years were 146 tonnes (2003), 140 tonnes (2002) and 153 tonnes (2001). 
In 2004, Turkmenistan￿s quota for sturgeon catch and black caviar export has been reduced by 
three tonnes: 56.25t sturgeon and 5.85t caviar. Except for Azerbaijan, the quotas of the other 20 
Caspian countries have remained near the previous year’s level: Russia (429t sturgeon and 30.3t 
caviar), Kazakhstan (216t and 23.18t), Iran (676.4t and 78.8t) and Azerbaijan (109t and 9.2t). 
 
Quota proportions and volumes continue to be hotly contested (see Anon., 2002j; Anon., 2002i; 
Ashirova, 2004). At the 21
st meeting of CBC in March 2004, representatives of Russia and 
Azerbaijan (with the silent support of Kazakhstan) insisted on a new method of setting quotas 
for sturgeon catch and caviar export, which includes criteria required for sturgeon reproduction 
(Ashirova 2004) proxied by the number of fish farms in each state. The CITES Secretariat 
approved the commission￿s decision. 
Allocating the TAC domestically 
Industry participants are likely to be comfortable with an auction system for quotas because it is 
used in other fisheries. A first-price auction system for quotas operates in the Russian 
Federation
13 and appears to be thriving, attracting greater numbers of buyers and increasing 
prices. Price per tonne in 2000 was six times the 1998 price (Anon., 2000; Anon., 2002a). In 
Iran, the state monopoly limits catch based on its TAC (Moiseev, 2002), but there is little 
information on the allocative processes operating in the other states. 
New entrants and monopoly power 
The case studies above offer several options on how to address these issues; usually entailing 
the imposition of trading restrictions. However, a regulating authority will need to examine the 
trade-off between imposing such trading restrictions and minimising costs for the fishers, as 
restrictions on the trading of ITQs limits the ability to achieve the latter. 
Monitoring and enforcement 
The case studies in Section 3 highlight the central importance of this issue. It is probably the 
most challenging issue for an effective ITQ system for the sturgeon in the Caspian Sea. 
Although ITQs can provide the appropriate incentives for long-term sustainable management of 
the resource, factors such as corruption, the alleged mafia, poaching, low average wages relative 
to caviar values, and the existing poverty within the region could undermine these policy goals. 
Crucially, little is known about the nature of illegal harvesting and poaching, and there is little 
precise information on the economic, social and institutional factors driving these. The 
apparently large number of participants in both legal and illegal fishing coupled with the 
extensive coastline further compound these problems. The CBC has been planning since 1995 
to create a united force of law enforcement officials from the five countries to staff anti-
poaching patrols in the Caspian Sea (Pala 2001). 
Penalties for non-compliance 
It is recommended that, in general, penalties for non-compliance should be approximately three 
to five times higher than the cost of purchasing an additional quota, to provide fishers with an 
adequate incentive to comply (EPA 2003). However, optimal penalties will vary depending on 
the monitoring and enforcement intensity as well as the probability of detection, and with the 
often high value of CITES Appendix II-listed species, these figures need to be determined on a 
case-by-case basis. To this end, more stringent penalties can include the forfeiture of quota 
shares, vessels and plant and other equipment. 
                                                     
13 Following Decree of the President of the Russian Federation from 08.04.97 № 305. 21 
  
Box 4.1  Industry responses to listing on CITES Appendix II 
Placing a species on Appendix II of CITES sends signals to the industry associated with trade in its 
derivatives that can be translated in economic terms. Outcomes of interventions depend on a variety of 
associated factors and prove difficult to predict. Broadly speaking, industry participants might anticipate: 
  ￿  more stable legal supply of raw material; 
  ￿  price rises in the short- to medium-term; and 
  ￿  illegal trade routes to either evolve or disappear. 
If this is the case, a variety of adjustments will have occurred since 1998 in the sturgeon fishery and its 
associated markets and trades; industry participants have taken decisions based on dynamic shifts as they 
occur. While Raymakers (2002) presents an initial attempt at understanding the nature and scale of these 
responses, data have not been systematically collected, and such analysis remains a priority for designing 
and implementing future economic incentive mechanisms based on efficient and conservation outcomes. 
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5. Specific programme design issues for sturgeon in Caspian 
littoral states 
Section 4 highlighted key design aspects of a proposed ITQ system for sturgeon. However, 
design needs to be informed more widely by economic, political, social and environmental 
aspects of the fishery as it currently stands and as it is anticipated to change under an ITQ 
system. This section highlights some key issues that represent both opportunities and constraints 
for ITQ design, implementation and, ultimately, success. Better comprehension of these factors 
will enable more efficient and sustainable solutions ￿ particularly ITQs ￿ to be promoted, 
designed and implemented for sturgeon populations in the Caspian Sea. 
5.1 Property rights and the geo-political climate 
Section 2.1 indicated that property rights are key to generating incentives to conserve wild 
populations.  Because of the transboundary nature of the Caspian Sea, an ITQ system for 
Caspian sturgeon would have to include all five Caspian littoral states. No international ITQ 
systems exist for any fishery in the world. Hence, coordinating the interests and activities of the 
five Caspian littoral states over the sturgeon fishery would probably require an international or 
regional agreement, and issues such as flag-hopping and quota-hopping would need to be 
controlled. Prior conditions might include: 
 
  collaboration between policy-makers and fishery scientists, as well as local stakeholder 
involvement;
14  
  appropriate political will, and domestic cooperation at different institutional levels (Aubry, 
2001; Farvar, 2001) ￿ see Box 5.1; 
  harmonisation of certain design options of the ITQ across the different states to ensure that 
all fishers are subject to the same incentives and that the ITQs are fungible across national 
borders;  
  consistent monitoring requirements and non-compliance penalties across all five states. 
 
A regional programme does exist: namely, the Caspian Environment Program
15 and this could 
be the body to distribute fishing rights. Of course, the choice of allocation method of the ITQs 
could remain with individual states.
16 To inform this choice, we need to understand the 
functioning of the domestic quota system in the Russian Federation.
17  
 
The precise impact on each state will be different: Iran￿s state-managed monopoly will require a 
different implementation strategy to establish an ITQ system than the Russian Federation. 
 
                                                     
14For instance, public participation and educational programmes will be required to ensure that participants 
involved understand how such a programme operates. 
15 See www.caspianenvironment.org.  
16 These issues have been raised in the context of international emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol of the 
UN Convention on Climate Change (see EC COM 2000:87), and in the design of the OTC NOx Budget Training 
Program for the eastern states of the USA (see OTC 1996). 
17 The system in operation for sturgeon in the Lower Danube (Siucu 2004) might yield useful information to inform 
design of systems for the Caspian Sea. 23 
Box 5.1  Specific property rights issues over the natural resources of the Caspian Sea 
First, the countries differ in: 
o  national management; 
o  socio-economic development; 
o  geography and proximity to a range of natural resources; and 
o  investment climate. 
Second, the countries cannot decide on ownership of their natural resources. From 1940 until the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the sea was joint Soviet-Iranian property (Suciu 2004). Then followed a confused period. In mid-
1998, the five countries that border the Caspian Sea met for the first time to discuss the need to balance natural 
resource exploitation with biological sustainability. Several property rights options emerged. 
o  Share: Russia and Iran want to see the five states share the resources since their immediate offshore 
waters do not contain significant reserves (Artyukov 2002). 
o  Condominium: whereby the seabed would be divided into five sections, but the water above would 
be shared. 
o  Column: Azerbaijan, on the other hand, wants to see the agreement go further and divide the ￿water-
column￿.  
Until a decision is made about how the Caspian will be divided, the current arrangements and poor communication 
between states is likely to continue to hinder advances in responsible environmental management (Hicks 1999; 
Anon. 2001a; Suciu 2004). In addition to sturgeon, several other environmental issues require collaborative efforts, 
including pollution abatement and oil exploitation. Some geo-political cooperation is taking place (on regional 
stability and security) and more is expected in the future (shared concerns include transport infrastructure) (Anon. 
2003a). Avoiding the risk of  the resource curse is of paramount importance (where potentially high gains from 
abundant valuable natural resources transfer overwhelmingly negative burdens to the state and lead to inequity as 
elites capture the rents (see Murshed 2004). One appealing argument is to re-invest some of the resource rents from 
oil exploration and extraction to develop a sustainable sturgeon fishery. 
 
5.2 Calculating the  TAC 
At the centre of an ITQ system is a scientifically calculated TAC. While there is debate over the 
robustness of data used to calculate the TAC for the Caspian Sea sturgeon (indeed, the 
biological underpinnings have been criticised for being both too high and too low), the CITES 
Secretariat is convinced that the figures used are precise (Armstrong et al. 2003; Armstrong and 
Karpyuk 2003). The population estimates of the beluga sturgeon presented in Table 5.1 illustrate  

















Table 5.1 Estimated numbers of beluga sturgeon in the Caspian Sea and percentage of 
adults, based on summer trawl surveys 
Year  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Numbers  7.6 mil.  9.3 mil.  5 mil.  9.3 mil.  11.6 mil. 
% adults  0 - 17.4%  8.7 - 10.0%  5.5%  14.8 - 22.0%  20.6 - 42.9% 
Number of spawners 
entering major* rivers  6,090 5,272 5,355 5,695  5,524 
Number of spawners 
harvested  2,118 1,454 1,182 1,059  1,121 
% of harvested 
specimens held for the 
hatcheries 
41% 72% 48% 69%  62% 
Source: CITES 2002; Armstrong and Karpyuk, 2003. 
* major rivers = Kura, Ural, Volga. 
The CITES Secretariat believes that not only is the beluga sturgeon population expanding (see 
Table 5.1), but the commercial proportion of this population is also increasing. The following 
sections investigate some of the difficulties of calculating the TAC for sturgeon in the Caspian 
Sea. 
Causality 
To design an efficient and successful ITQ system, it is important to have evidence of the 
causality underlying population decline. For sturgeon populations, there are conflicting views 
on the significance of the following: 
   oil pollution ￿ it is unclear whether pollution is localised at the mouths of the Volga, Ural 
and Kura rivers (Werth, 2001, Dahl, 2003); or endemic (Hicks, 1999); 
   overfishing; 
   Mnemiopsis ledyi (jellyfish) ￿ impacts on sturgeon food biomass from recent invasions in 
the Caspian Sea (Hicks 1999; Farvar 2001; Kirby 2002; Pearce 2004). 
Hatcheries 
The sturgeon population is maintained through two forms of recruitment: natural growth and 
artificial recruitment from hatcheries. This makes it difficult to identify of the root causes of low 
populations. The impact of the hatcheries, and the estimated 0.5 to 2 billion fingerlings released 
over the past 40 years, on population dynamics is a critical issue (De Meulenaer and Raymakers 
1996; Anon. 2002b; Bennett 2004; Ivanov et al. 2001; Armstrong et al. 2003), as is their impact 
on future conservation strategies (Anon. 2002c; Anon. 2002d). 
 
The economics are intriguing, yet uncertain.  Further information is required on the following 
with regard to the functioning of hatcheries and the attendant incentives.   
  Hatchery ownership and funding. Moiseev (2002) states that ￿funding for enhancement 
is derived from the revenues from legal harvesting and trade￿.  25 
  Diversification of hatchery production - the extent to which sturgeon juveniles are 
produced for export to captive-breeding establishments and for aquaculture in the 
Caspian Sea and its tributaries (Pala, 2002). 
 
Box 5.2  Domestic consumption 
Meat 
￿  Domestic retail is illegal, and is therefore not systematically monitored. 
￿  There is a large (but unquantified) domestic market for sturgeon meat. Raymakers (2002) indicates that it 
currently retails at about double the price of beef on most markets in Russia. The market for sturgeon meat within 
the Caspian Sea littoral states could be an important driver of harvest (both legal and illegal). However, the 
significance of this is unknown.   
￿  There is some evidence that supply determines prices since during the sturgeon migration meat prices fall by 
up to 30 per cent and caviar prices by up to 10 per cent (Raymakers 2002).  
Caviar 
￿  Domestic retail is illegal, and is therefore not systematically monitored.  
￿  There appears to be a large (but unquantified) domestic market for caviar within the Caspian Sea littoral states. 
So, international trade bans will prove ineffective for sturgeon populations (Anon. 2001b; Hamilton 2003).  
￿  It has a luxury value in caviar-producing countries and internationally. 
 
The flexible nature of ITQs offers opportunities to incorporate the hatchery issue, but financing 
for hatcheries will need to be sustainable. Options here might include bolt-on regulations and 
the use of other economic incentives (EIs). 
Harvest rates 
For sturgeon and other CITES Appendix II-listed species, total harvest levels are difficult to 
estimate because of illegal activity (see Box 5.1) and unreported domestic consumption (see 
Box 5.2). But estimates of the scale of these activities would be valuable for TAC calculation, 
although both require further research. 
Legal industry dynamics:  industry structure, supply chains and market power 
Understanding the industry is key to ITQ design, particularly its structure, relationships and 
incentives. Studies of other CITES Appendix II-listed species have shown that understanding 
industrial structure helps identify levers for conservation (MacGregor 2002). 
There is evidence to suggest that the structure of the fishery trade chain for Caspian sturgeon is 
static: fishermen to processor to traders to retailers. But, the scale and significance of industry 
participation is uncertain. Furthermore, we lack the necessary information to expand this static 
structure into a dynamic ￿model￿, which could anticipate changes brought about by ITQs (or 
other interventions). 
Socio-economics 
Sturgeon are important to local livelihoods. The majority of individual fishermen poaching 
sturgeon are believed to be poor with few alternative sources of income (see  Box 5.3). 
Revenues from illegal sales of sturgeon form a significant portion of their earnings (Anon. 
2001c; Raymakers 2002; Saffron 2002; Novruzov 2004). Furthermore, alleged links with 
organised crime groups (OCGs) make it difficult to address these complicated rural livelihood 26 
issues. Clearly, EIs will require complementary measures such as rural credit, retraining and 
provision of extension services, to ensure that alternative livelihood options are available for 
fishermen. 
ITQ allocation that aims to provide equitable benefits will need to take into account the 
incentives for participants. Potential innovations might be to divide the fishery into large and 
small vessels, as happens with artisenal fishery systems in many countries, including Chile and 
Cambodia. 
 
The economic incentives for poor individuals are not easily incorporated into policy. Indeed, 
there is a theoretical gap; there is a myth that if someone currently harvesting a species ￿makes 
more money￿ per unit of species, they will be keener to conserve the species and less likely to 
deplete it. This will depend on the nature of prevailing property rights. While ITQ systems can 
provide a compliant structure for this, understanding the current mix of incentives for these 
individual fishers is needed to inform and frame the ITQ design. 
 
Box 5.3 Illegal trade and EIs 
Although it is impractical to expect detailed data on the scale of illegal activities, an understanding of the 
nature of illegal trade will be crucial to informing design of an ITQ system. There is conflicting 
anecdotal evidence that before 1991, poaching of sturgeon was both limited (Słyland 2000) and 
excessive (Moiseev 2002). As the Soviet Union imploded organised crime groups (OCGs) increased 
(Hendley et al. 1999). They concentrated on a wide range of lucrative and foreign exchange-earning 
commodity chains, including caviar and sturgeon meat. Today, there is evidence that poaching takes 
place on a significant scale (Raymakers, 2002). It is often stated that the Russian mafia controls the 
illegal sturgeon fishery and caviar trade.  Yet, there is little accessible literature discussing the mafia or 
OCGs in relation to sturgeon. Most of it is anecdotal. There is no information about the organisational 
aspects of these groups. Recent evidence suggests that the authorities were also involved in illegal 
activities, including assigning quotas to selected businesses (Anon. 2004d). 
 
There are indications that OCGs operating in the former Soviet Union consist of many gangs, which  
control economic activities in specific locations. Connections and agreements exist between the ￿leaders￿ 
of these geographical cells (Varese 2000). This neatly fits with global experience with OCG activity, in 
which OCGs:  
   govern an underworld within defined borders; 
   become monopoly suppliers of protection services; and, 
   become monopoly buyers of certain commodities.  
  
Certain services, such as gambling, money-lending and drug-dealing, are more suited than others to 
being supplied by a monopoly.  The same is true for trade in certain commodities ￿produced￿ by a region 
￿ including illegally traded goods, such as sturgeon and caviar. Sturgeon meat and the caviar are 
probably among several products and services controlled by an OCG. 
 
Designing an EI for a species subject to considerable illegal activity 
The success of any EI will often depend on whether the EI mechanism can generate sufficient incentives 
for the legal industry to begin enforcing itself. For the purposes of designing and implementing 
conservation-based EIs, it is useful to establish a simple framework for better understanding of the nature 
of illegal activity. In this way we might begin to understand some of its inherent incentives, and crucially 
whether and how these require realigning for efficient design and implementation of ITQs. 
 
Activities 
We do not know the extent of OCG involvement in any of these activities. But it is likely that an OCG 
will perform two roles with respect to sturgeon fishing and the caviar trade: 
  Protection ￿ payment for a range of ￿protection￿ services to the OCG by legal fishing companies ￿27 
Słyland (2000) estimates that up to one-third of the catch of the legal fishery fleet is 
unaccounted for in this way. 
  Sole buyer and sole seller ￿ subcontracting individuals, ￿gangs￿ or even entire village fishing fleets to 
supply caviar for domestic and international markets. Throughout the supply chain, Bennett 
(2004) describes how processors of small amounts of poached caviar need few tools and 
minimal capital investment to operate. For the OCG, it is simply a matter of monopolising 
buyer rights from a local community, ensuring rudimentary quality and storage standards, and 
finding a buyer for the aggregated stock. 
 
Participants and location 
It is unclear precisely who the participants are and whether ￿gangs￿ (Anon. 2003b) or opportunistic 
individual fishers (Saffron 2002) are the more significant. Anecdotal evidence suggests that sturgeon 
poaching is devolved and that there are considerable financial incentives for individual fishers to poach. 
 
If the above is true, it is significant because it suggests that illegal activity is not a parallel industry but 
rather opportunistic and potentially involves all individual fishermen. This would mean the risks of 
poaching are devolved to the individual fisherman and/or boat, making enforcement doubly difficult. 
It seems clear that post-1991 and particularly post-CITES listing, the illegal trade changed and 
(potentially) narrowed. Of course, we must maintain the possibility that it is not a slick functioning 
activity but rather haphazard and random. 
 
5.3 Financing conservation 
EIs can generate significant revenue for a government or regulatory authority, which could be 
used to address equity issues, by:  
  providing compensation for those who are unable to participate in the fishery (e.g., by 
providing re-training and education programmes for alternative employment opportunities);  
  explicitly enabling local smaller fishers to participate, by setting-aside ITQs for those fishers 
(Borregaard et al. 2001), or to communities in general (Farvar 2001) as discussed in the case 
studies in Section 3. 
 
Revenues from ITQ auctions will be earmarked for monitoring and enforcement costs that will 
probably be necessary to ensure an effective ITQ programme, as well as new administrative 
costs.  
5.4 Demand for the final products 
Demand analysis combined with supply analysis enables policy-makers and EI designers to 
understand the drivers of the trade. This includes the transmission of price signals throughout 
the supply chain and the associated risks. It can help forecast the effect of proposed changes or 
interventions impinging on EIs and conservation. 
 
There are few analyses of the price and demand responses to a listing on CITES Appendices 
(see Box 4.1). In mature markets in agricultural products, scarcity is often inferred from spot 
prices. Markets for scarce wild species have peculiar characteristics. Not only is the supply level 







Caviar is a luxury good and its demand profile is complex, peculiar and irregular (Armstrong et 
al. 2003): 
   Consumer preferences do not obey conventional economic principles. For instance, rising 
retail prices might lead to increased demand.
18 
   Scarcity is key. Both ownership of distribution channels and supply levels help to explain 
high prices (Anon., 2004b; Anon., 2004c; Saffron, 2002). 
   The demand for caviar by wealthier consumers is not well explained by conventional 
economic cycles; rather by events and cycles that impact on international travel  
   Caviar in a store suggests high-quality merchandise throughout the store. One of the 
traditional reasons for stocking high-quality caviar is to sell other associated (and often 
cheaper) products. It is also said to create a reputation for quality for the retailer and 
generate repeat sales. 
 
There are similarities with other luxury goods.   
   Immense value is created along the supply chain; most of this value is attributable to the 
brand.
19 
   The challenge of maintaining brand integrity is a key concern. 
   Sales are through exclusive retail outlets: boutiques, airports and flagship department stores 
throughout the world. 
 
5.5  A brief history of demand for caviar from the Caspian Sea 
During the 70 years of Communist rule, a sophisticated and (apparently) efficient state 
monopoly linked the sturgeon fishery with the international caviar retail trade. The supply chain 
was short and relatively simple. 
   International trade was restricted by the state monopoly to 10 per cent of production to 
maintain a high price (Saffron 2002). 
   This monopoly dealt mainly with a few wholesalers: Petrossian, France; D&H, Germany; 
Caviar House, Switzerland; Romanoff, USA; and Porimex, Switzerland. 
   Wholesalers, in turn, dealt mainly with a few large volume buyers: airlines, hotels, cruise 
ships and small boutiques (Uldry 2001; Saffron 2002). 
A marshalled supply chain with buyer concentration creates incentives for retailer-led 
cultivation of the caché of caviar, and is pivotal to development of an elite retail brand. Added 
to this are the product perishability, uncertain supply and a lack of access to the final consumers 
for potential new entrants. 
The monopoly collapsed in 1991. 
  Supply chain became complicated; 
  Supply became more dispersed as new entrants edged into the caviar market 
                                                     
18 These goods are not true luxury goods in an economic sense, but are sold into markets that accentuate and 
promote the concept of prestige. 
19 The resilience of the brand is a key concept to consider when designing EIs. Brands resilient to adverse publicity 
and abrupt changes in demand and supply inspire industry confidence and are most likely to last in a luxury goods 
market. 29 
  Demand became more dispersed ; caviar stores opened in urban America (Saffron 2002).  
  Consumers increased and became dispersed, which reduced their role in any effective future 
conservation solution. This re-emphasised the case for some form of EI at producer level. 
  The relatively sudden collapse of the monopoly appears to have caught the larger buyers by 
surprise (Uldry 2001). 
 
The illegal trade since 1991 is not surprising given the combination of: 
  porous borders; 
  unemployed fishermen; 
  easily caught fish; and  
  potential gains by participants from the trade. 
 
Open access replaced the monopoly conditions, and caviar flooded the market. In spite of these 
changes, caviar products appear to have maintained their brand integrity. From an economic 
and conservation standpoint, this is positive; caviar has the attributes of an enduring luxury. And 
the market is growing. The U.S. makes up about 80 per cent of the world’s beluga caviar 
market, and imported an estimated $20 million (￿20.6 million) of all types of caviar in 2001 
(Horvath 2002). Consumers appear willing to pay for the best available quality. Theoretically, if 
well managed, Caspian Sea littoral states could turn this to their advantage. 
Competition 
Intra-market competition: Caviar consumers, their locations and their preferences are changing. 
The caviar industry, its supply chain and associated markets are also changing. Luxury markets 
are increasingly competitive and the design of an ITQ needs to take account of potential shocks 
emanating from changes in these markets, such as the risk of a brand or product losing market 
share to a newcomer. 
 
Substitutes: Competition from other sturgeon, and cross-elasticities of demand between 
products associated with caviar should be better understood; since caviar is currently produced 
in a number of countries and substitution across these is possible. While supply from the 
Caspian Sea is unlikely to increase significantly in the near future, captive-bred sturgeon and 
non-sturgeon roes could upset the market with exponential growth through aquaculture 
development. 
 
Ex situ propagation and production of caviar: There is a large and lucrative international trade 
in fertilised eggs and live specimens between range states and captive breeding centres 
(Animals Committee 2000; Anon. 2003c; Anon. 2003d). Experience shows captive breeding of 
wild species has a number of market impacts: greater supply, increased differentiation of and 
competition among final products, and lower unit prices (see MacGregor 2001, 2002, 2003). 
 
Ranching: Advances in technology are increasing caviar production without the harvesting of 
sturgeon. This leads to a form of sturgeon ranching in situ, where sturgeon have restricted 
movement and are protected, and their eggs occasionally harvested.  
   In Russia scientists have pioneered a safe way of manually extracting caviar without killing 
the fish, keeping them in pens (Armstrong 2004).  
   In Kazakhstan scientists are testing a drug that induces sturgeon to expel eggs without an 
operation (Bennett 2004). 30 
Competition from other roes: There are a host of other roes from other fish species on the 
market, some of which have economic interactions with caviar in final consumer markets. 
Varieties include local specialties from Iceland, Japan (tobiko), China (keluga) and the United 
States (whitefish, salmon, trout, lumpfish, and hackleback). There are also more widely 
available alternatives such as lobster roe, golden black herring roe, anchovy roe, and grey 
mullet roe. This wide range of qualities and types is said to have affected caviar￿s consumer 
acceptance and its cachØ. But this is not certain. 
Conservation campaigns encouraging consumer boycotts of caviar 
 
   The campaign, Caviar Emptor: Let the Connoisseur Beware
20 seeks a halt in international 
trade in beluga caviar as a means of protecting sturgeon, and is urging US consumers to 
consider domestic caviars as an alternative (Anon 2002e). 
   More recently, over 100 chefs and retailers in the USA have signed a letter to Interior 
Secretary Gail Norton supporting a beluga caviar import ban (Hamilton 2003). 
   Both have been applauded by US caviar farmers and opposed by caviar importers 
(Simpson 2004). 
 
The ￿success￿ of these campaigns is uncertain, but it is important for their impact to be analysed 
as this will help increase our understanding of the demand-side factors and particularly 
consumer preferences. Design of future interventions for conservation that target consumers 
will be better informed. Understanding these factors in the demand-side of the trade chain will 
help to forecast trends in attitudes. With better intelligence on the functioning of the trade chain 
under different conditions, this will in turn relate these trends back to the health of the resource. 
Specific trends that require better comprehension and monitoring include: 
   Buyer confidence: Recent environmental campaigns have focused consumers and, more 
importantly, retail store buyers￿ attention on sturgeon conservation status. These buyers are 
increasingly larger corporate entities, anxious to avoid disruption due to their buying 
policies. While regulation has apparently instilled confidence in caviar products (Lang 
1999), this factor warrants closer attention. 
   Buyer identity:  The profile of consumers of luxury goods is changing, particularly in the 
USA.  Demand drivers for luxury goods are increasingly middle market consumers
21, as 
consumers from diverse socio-economic backgrounds experiment with luxury goods 
(Silverstein, Fiske and Butman 2003). If this is the case for caviar, are industry profit 
margins being squeezed? 
   Differentiation of product: Caviar is appearing in all aspects of the menu, being served as a 
garnish, an ingredient, and an entrØe (Moran 2000). 
   Timing: Seasonal aspects of the caviar market remain significant, particularly Christmas 
and New Year celebrations (Moran 2000, 2002; Wolff 2001). However, whereas previously 
certain consumers would buy caviar in any economic cycle, consumption is becoming 
increasingly related to world economic cycles (Redmayne 2002). 
                                                     
20 Run by SeaWeb, University of Miami￿s Pew Institute for Ocean Science and Natural Resources Defence Council. 
21 See also Schor (2002); Brooks (2000). 31 
6.  Conclusions and policy recommendations  
Building on Bulte, Swanson and Van Kooten (2003), this scoping study has explored the 
potential for, pitfalls of, and ex-ante considerations for one type of economic incentive: an ITQ 
programme for sturgeon in the Caspian Sea.  
Establishing ITQs throughout the Caspian Sea is a considerable challenge: there is currently no 
international ITQ system for any fishery; crucial information is either missing or incomplete; 
and wider but related geo-political issues take precedence. Yet, there are many initial conditions 
that favour ITQ development. Quota auctions are used to allocate quotas for other fisheries, and 
there is collaboration over other collective natural resources of the Caspian Sea. In addition, 
international demand for caviar appears sustainable at high prices, indicating large potential 
gains for all industry participants from the sustainable management of sturgeon. This demand-
side characteristic is significant and could provide the economic foundation for a sustainable 
solution. Under the right conditions, regulation would be the preferred route of the majority of 
firms associated with the sturgeon resource, and ITQs can provide a suitable regulatory 
framework. 
To enhance conditions for developing an ITQ system that can deliver pro-poor conservation, 
further clarity is required on: 
   economic questions, including the nature of the illegal trade, structure of the trade chain, 
livelihoods issues and consumer preference; 
   biological questions, specifically the relative significance of the various causes of depletion 
of sturgeon populations; 
     capacity building requirements of resource managers, institutions and decision makers. 
 
The findings of this study have broad resonance for other CITES-listed or scarce species, 
highlighting potential issues and opportunities for EIs. Solutions should build on the positive 
impacts of trade and use, while aiming to mitigate the costs. 
In conclusion, in order to implement an effective ITQ system as an economic incentive to 
conserve wildlife, the following factors need to be considered.  
•  Integrated approach: recognising that EIs are not a panacea. Instead, economic 
information needs to be collected and incorporated within a flexible system that 
incorporates social, political and biological information and that enables local conditions 
to be adequately reflected. 
 
•  Causality: the variety of causes of wildlife loss need to be considered. In particular, a 
better understanding is required of the linkages between trade and use patterns, and 
habitat changes caused by other human activity.  
 
•  Time: successful ITQs are the result of learning-by-doing, experimentation and innovation 
over considerable time periods. 
 
•  Economic information needs to be routinely collected to feed into decision-making, 
review and analysis. 32 
o  Resource managers’ needs must be given due consideration to ensure 
economic signals are consistent with conservation objectives. Incentives for 
resource managers are often far from perfect and can generate outcomes that 
conflict with pro-poor conservation. 
o  Demand-side pressures that generate incentives for production need to be 
understood, particularly the nature of both legal and illegal demand, and the 
structure of the trade chain. 
o  Domestic support from legal, social and political frameworks to is required to 
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